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Abstract 
We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where 
they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers 
differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of 
punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation 
increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. 
Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, 
and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are 
more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting 
decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available. 
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1 Introduction 
Cooperation—acting for the joint benefit of a group—is a key issue in the social and behavioral 
sciences, and it has been studied extensively by experimental economists. Achieving cooperation 
is especially challenging when individuals cannot develop personal ties, thus interacting as 
“strangers.” There are still two aspects of cooperation in groups of strangers, which are relatively 
unexplored in experiments. First, whether results that emerge from studies based on a typical 
population of undergraduate students can be generalized to non-standard subject pools, which 
are characterized by a wider array of life and work experiences. Second, if and how adding a 
personal punishment opportunity to a standard social dilemma affects the strategies adopted at 
the individual level. We address these substantive and methodological issues by carrying out a 
study of cooperation, in which the task is repeated indefinitely and subjects cannot rely on 
reputation. The patterns of behavior of college students are compared to those of white-collar 
workers, in treatments with and without a personal punishment opportunity. The benchmark 
subject pool in the experiment consisted of undergraduate students from various disciplines at 
Purdue University, a large U.S. university. The non-standard subject pool comprised clerical 
workers employed as staff throughout Purdue University. These workers were mostly long-time 
local residents who exhibited a wide variation in age and educational backgrounds and did not 
have prior experience with laboratory experiments.1  
In the experiment, pairs of subjects played a prisoner’s dilemma either with or without the 
opportunity to engage in personal punishment. They interacted as strangers for an indefinite 
number of periods: subjects could neither identify the person they were matched with, nor see 
                                                 
1 Some student participants had previous experience with laboratory experiments. One may conjecture that a 
common experience that cooperation in experimental tasks tends to yield higher earnings could have influenced 
behavior. We thank a referee for pointing this out. Overall, we did not have precise ex-ante expectations about how 
workers would be different from students. 
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their history of play. According to folk theorem-type results, this setting admits multiple 
equilibria, including one with 100% cooperation (Kandori, 1992, Ellison, 1994). Indefinite 
repetition helps to overcome the short-run temptation to cheat others. This is the case if players 
adopt a norm of behavior based on the threat of relentless decentralized punishment, i.e., they 
permanently cease to cooperate after seeing just one defection; this is called  the “grim” strategy. 
Here, personal punishment is theoretically neither necessary nor sufficient to sustain cooperation 
with identical, rational, and self-regarding agents. Evidence from previous studies indicates that 
cooperation levels are low when subjects do not know each other and cannot build reputations 
(e.g., Ostrom, 2010), and cooperation increases substantially when there are personal punishment 
opportunities (e.g., Ostrom, et al. 1992, Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). 
Our design closely reflects the decentralized trading environment in Kandori (1992) and 
Ellison (1994). This generates theoretical predictions that serve as a reference in the 
interpretation of the empirical findings. In the paper, we assess (i) the strategies adopted by 
individuals in each subject pool, (ii) how students and workers differ in their ability to achieve 
cooperation, when many cooperation rates are supported in equilibrium, and (iii) how the 
additional opportunity to inflict a personal punishment affects individual strategies. 
The design is as follows. Each participant played a supergame of indefinite duration within a 
group of four subjects. In every period, the group was randomly partitioned into two pairs of 
subjects and every pair played a prisoner’s dilemma (PD). In the literature, the PD is the standard 
platform for studies on cooperation. The interaction was anonymous and subjects could only 
observe actions and outcomes in their own pair. Hence, even though each group interacted 
repeatedly, this design made it impossible for a single participant to build an individually 
identifiable reputation. Because of the random matching process, all participants could do was to 
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form a general assessment about what to expect from the average member of their group. We call 
this setting a “strangers” design. This setting excludes reputation-based strategies as an 
explanation for cooperation, and brings to the forefront strategies that do not discriminate 
individuals based on their identity. As an additional advantage, this stranger design facilitates the 
identification of strategies adopted by subjects, because it exposes participants to a variety of 
counterparts. 
We also introduced in the experiment the possibility of adopting personal punishment. Each 
subject had the costly opportunity to immediately respond to a counterpart's action by lowering 
her payoff in the period. Cooperators and defectors alike could be punished. We are especially 
interested in studying if and how subjects use personal punishment to complement or to 
substitute for decentralized sanctioning schemes that rely on future defections. 
In previous work (Camera, Casari, and Bigoni, 2012), we questioned the empirical validity of 
the theoretical notion that play is homogeneous and that subjects implicitly coordinate on full 
cooperation when such an equilibrium is available. This previous study revealed that the 
behavior of only one out of four subjects was consistent with the use of the grim trigger strategy. 
It also revealed that, as subjects gained experience with the game, they kept experimenting with 
different strategies and managed neither to achieve full cooperation nor to coordinate on 
cooperative strategies. 
This paper moves forward the study of equilibrium selection and individual strategy adoption 
in two directions. First, it explicitly compares aggregate and individual behavior of two diverse 
subject-pools. Second, it extends the analysis of strategies from a case where subjects can only 
resort to decentralized punishment, to a design in which they also have the opportunity to engage 
in personal punishment. We report substantial differences between subject pools; both in 
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aggregate and individual behavior, and in the design with and without the personal punishment 
opportunity. Students exhibit higher levels of aggregate cooperation than workers. Students are 
also less likely than workers to adopt unconditional strategies, and more likely to select strategies 
of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more inclined than workers to sanction 
defections through decentralized punishment and personal punishment, when available. 
 
2 Related experimental literature 
Our study is related to the experimental literature about differences in behavior and in strategies 
adopted by subjects with different socio-demographic characteristics. One methodological issue 
still open in this literature is whether results from a standard undergraduate population generalize 
to other populations, a question which is related to the external validity of experimental results 
(Harrison and List, 2004, Ball and Cech, 1996). There are only a few published studies on games 
of trust and cooperation, which compare students to non-student samples; the main message is 
that students are less cooperative and that age tends to be negatively correlated with cooperation.  
The literature on public good games indicates that students contribute on average less than 
non-students. This result is supported by several studies involving non-student subjects (e.g., 
Carpenter and Seki, 2006, Egas and Riedl, 2008). See also Burks et al. (2009), for a one shot 
prisoners’ dilemma game with student and non-student populations. Students also tend to 
cooperate less than non-students in trust and investment games, exhibiting a less trusting and 
trustworthy behavior (e.g., Fehr and List 2004, Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007). Overall, there is 
evidence that age is positively related to trust and trustworthiness (e.g., Gaechter et al., 2004, 
Sutter and Kocher, 2007, Hannan et al., 2002). 
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A growing number of experimental studies collect empirical evidence about strategy 
adoption in indefinitely repeated social dilemmas. Most of these studies involve a short time 
horizon and a subject pool of undergraduate students only (e.g., Kurzban and Houser, 2005, 
Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006, Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2009, Fudenberg et al., 2012, Davis et 
al., 2011). In contrast, our design is based on a game with a longer horizon and it includes 
workers as participants. It complements and extends the works in Camera and Casari (2009), on 
the impact of information on cooperation, and in Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2012), on 
individual strategy adoption in a standard subject pool. The current paper presents two main 
elements of novelty relative to the aforementioned studies. First, here we study how the 
availability of personal punishment affects strategy adoption; personal punishment is known to 
strongly affect aggregate behavior, although not much is known about how it affects individual 
strategies. Second, we investigate whether there are any subject-pool specificities in strategy 
adoption and realized cooperation levels. 
The experimental literature on the effects of punishment on cooperation has mostly focused 
on one-shot and finitely repeated social dilemmas. Subjects display a tendency to engage in 
costly personal punishment of others, especially of defectors. Although this behavior is 
inconsistent with personal income maximization, it has been shown to be remarkably robust 
(e.g., Ostrom et al, 1992, Casari and Luini, 2009). We examine whether and how this behavioral 
trait impacts on the strategies adopted to sustain cooperation in an indefinitely repeated game, 
where subjects can also use a decentralized punishment scheme to police defections. A 
decentralized punishment scheme consists of indiscriminately punishing every group member in 
every period that follows a defection, not just the counterpart who actually defected. 
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3 Experimental design 
The experiment consists of four treatments, characterized by a different combination of two 
treatment variables: the availability of a personal punishment option (no punishment, NP, or 
personal punishment, PP) and the nature of the subject pool (students or workers). Continuation 
probability, stage game parameters, matching protocols, and private monitoring are kept 
constant. The NP treatment is a baseline environment designed to study strategy selection in an 
indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma among strangers, where individual reputation formation 
is impossible. In an additional treatment (PP treatment), we also study how behavior is 
influenced by the availability of punishment institutions, i.e., when subjects have the option to 
use personal punishment.2 To investigate whether realized outcomes and adopted individual 
strategies vary across different subject pools, we ran experiments with undergraduates and white 
collar workers. Below we describe the stage game, the continuation probability and the matching 
protocols, which are identical across treatments. 
Each participant played a supergame within a group of four persons who interacted privately and 
anonymously. In each period, subjects were randomly matched in pairs. As we will employ non-
cooperative equilibrium theory to develop theoretical predictions, we refer to a subject’s 
counterpart in a pair as the “opponent.” The interaction was private because subjects could only 
observe the outcomes of their pair. The interaction was anonymous because subjects could not 
observe identities; thus, building an individual reputation was impossible. 
 The stage game was the prisoners’ dilemma described in Table 1. In the experiment, 
subjects could choose between C (=Cooperate) and D (=Defect). The parameters of the 
experiment were calibrated to promote some cooperative choices, a feature that is necessary to 
                                                 
2 These two treatments respectively correspond to the Private Monitoring and Private Monitoring with Personal 
Punishment treatments in Camera and Casari (2009). 
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uncover the strategies that participants adopt to support cooperative outcomes.3   
Player 1 
Player 2 
Cooperate 
 
Defect 
 
Cooperate 25, 25 5, 30 
Defect 30, 5 10, 10 
 
Table 1: The stage game 
Notes to Table 1: the labels in the instructions were Y for Cooperate and Z for Defect 
A supergame (or cycle, as in the instructions) consisted of an indefinitely repeated interaction 
among subjects, achieved by a random continuation rule; see Roth and Murninghan (1978) or 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994). To implement this rule, at the end of each period the program 
drew a random integer between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution. The cycle continued 
with a draw of 95 or below. Hence, in each period a cycle continued with a constant probability 
 For a risk-neutral subject  represents the discount factor. In each period, the cycle was 
expected to continue for 19 additional periods. All session participants observed the same 
random draw, meaning that cycles terminated simultaneously for all the economies. 
Each experimental session comprised twenty subjects and five cycles. We built twenty-five 
economies in each session by creating five groups of four subjects in each of the five cycles. 
Matching across cycles followed a perfect stranger protocol: in each cycle each group included 
only subjects who had neither been part of the same group in previous cycles nor were part of the 
same group in future cycles. Subjects were informed that no two participants would ever interact 
together for more than one cycle. With this matching protocol across cycles, we can consider 
each subject as having five distinct “lives” in a session. 
In every cycle, the participants of each four-subjects group interacted in pairs as follows. At 
                                                 
3 The parameterization in Table 1 was selected as it scores high on the indexes proposed by Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965) and Roth and Murnighan (1978), and those indexes correlate with the level of cooperation in the indefinitely 
repeated prisoners’ dilemma in a partner protocol.  
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the beginning of each period of the cycle, the group was randomly divided into two pairs. In 
every period, each subject had one third probability of meeting any other participant. For the 
entire cycle, a subject exclusively interacted with the members of her group. In each group, 
subjects could neither observe identities of their opponents, nor communicate with each other, 
nor observe the histories of others. As a consequence, the subjects did not share a common 
history.4  
The PP treatment introduced an additional punishment possibility to the baseline design; we 
call it “personal punishment” to differentiate it from the decentralized punishment scheme 
discussed earlier, which on the other hand involves the entire group. Subjects could lower the 
opponent’s earnings, at a cost. This was done by adding a second stage to the game played in 
each round. The first stage was the prisoners’ dilemma in Table 1. After observing the outcome 
in the prisoner’s dilemma, both subjects in the pair had the opportunity to pay 5 points to reduce 
the opponent's earnings by 10 points. These decisions were simultaneous. Outside the pair, no 
one could observe outcomes or actions, including personal punishment. 
The second treatment variable is the subject pool. The experiment involved two distinct 
groups of subjects: 80 undergraduate students from various disciplines at Purdue University and 
80 clerical workers employed as staff throughout Purdue University. Undergraduates have a 
strong international component, while clerical workers are mostly long-time state residents, who 
exhibit a wide variation in age and educational background. Table 2 reports a summary of the 
main demographic characteristics of the two subject pools. 
                                                 
4 This experimental design expands the scope of the analysis when it comes to designs for two-person groups. First, 
subjects face a wider variety of behavior, which facilitates the empirical identification of strategies. Second, we can 
investigate strategies that are not based on reputation, since we can control anonymity. Third, it allows investigation 
of how subjects coordinate on outcomes and strategies in situations where coordination is more challenging than in 
two-member groups.  
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We ran two sessions per treatment. Each session had 20 participants and 5 cycles. The 80 
student subjects were recruited through e-mail and in-class-announcements. The 80 worker 
subjects were recruited through e-mails targeted to administrative and technical staff across the 
West Lafayette campus. Each subject participated in only one session. Some students had 
previously participated in other types of economics experiments, while none of the workers had. 
Sessions were run in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Lab at Purdue University. No 
eye contact was possible among subjects. Instructions were read aloud with copies on all desks; a 
copy of the instructions can be found in Appendix B. The experiment was programmed using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Average earnings were $18, excluding show-up fees. A session lasted 
on average 84 periods, for a running time of about 2 hours, including instruction reading and a 
quiz.5 
 
Students (N=80) Workers (N=80) 
 Average Missing   Average Missing  
Male 53.8% 0  63.6% 3 
Age 21.2 10  37.4 14 
Married 5.0% 40  50.6% 3 
With children 2.5% 40  53.3% 5 
Gross family income > $50,000 65.2% 57  43.5% 18 
Home owner 5.0% 40  64.0% 5 
Education: college or higher  10.0% 40  57.1% 3 
Work experience (years)  2 0  13.5 0 
                                                 
5 Sessions took place on the following dates for NP: 21.4.05 (71) and 7.9.05 (104) with undergraduates, 29.11.05 
(80) and 06.12.05 (50) with clerical workers; for PP: 28.04.05 (139) and 06.09.05 (99) with undergraduates, 8.12.05 
(56) and 13.07.06 (77) with clerical workers. In parenthesis we report the total number of periods for the session. 
Show-up fees are as follows: students received $5 ($0 on 06.09.05); clerical workers received $5 in the PP and $10 
in the NP treatments. Data of the first two sessions in treatments NP and PP are also analyzed in Camera and Casari 
(2009), which however does not analyze individual strategies. Data of all sessions of the NP treatment are also 
analyzed in Camera, Casari and Bigoni (2011).  
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Foreign born 18.9% 43  7.7% 2 
Table 2. Demographic characteristics 
Notes to Table 2: Data are self-reported by subject in the questionnaire. Some observations are missing because 
subjects either did not respond, or had a different version of the questionnaire. 
 
4 Theoretical considerations  
Here we offer theoretical equilibrium considerations, based on the Folk theorem-type results 
proved in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) for random matching economies.6 
Consider identical, self-regarding and risk-neutral players. The stage game is a prisoner’s 
dilemma where total surplus in the group is maximized when everyone chooses C (=efficient 
outcome) and hence earns c=25, and minimized when everyone selects D (=inefficient outcome) 
and earns d=10. The Nash equilibrium is unique and corresponds to the inefficient outcome. 
Indefinite repetition of the stage game with random participants supports a large set of 
sequential equilibrium outcomes. We discuss two equilibria. First, the strategy “always defect” is 
always a sequential equilibrium, because D is a best response to play of D by any randomly 
chosen opponent. In this inefficient outcome everyone earns d in each period, hence the payoff is 
d/(). Second, if δ is sufficiently high, then 100% cooperation can be sustained in each period 
as a sequential equilibrium (Kandori 1992, Ellison 1994). In this efficient outcome every player 
earns the payoff c/(1). More precisely, let *(0,1) be the unique value of  that satisfies 
032(2 =c)(hd)chδ+d)(hδ  . 
Here h=30 is the payoff when the player defects while the opponent cooperates. If   *, then 
the efficient outcome is a sequential equilibrium; this sufficient condition is satisfied in all 
experimental treatments because =0.95>*=0.443. 
                                                 
6 Details on derivations are in the Appendix to Camera and Casari (2009). 
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To see how players can support the efficient outcome, consider a situation in which all 
players adopt the grim trigger strategy. This social norm is a rule of behavior that identifies a 
desirable play, and also a decentralized punishment scheme to be implemented if a departure 
from desirable play is ever observed. Put simply, each player starts cooperating and keeps 
cooperating, unless someone defects; in that case the player switches to a punishment phase 
consisting of “always defect.” This triggers a contagious, indiscriminate and relentless 
punishment process. Although people may not ordinarily follow a grim trigger strategy in 
practice, theorists employ it widely when tracing the cooperation frontier in repeated games. 
Because defection is an absorbing state, such decentralized punishment threat ensures that no-
one deviates in equilibrium, as long as players sufficiently value future payoffs. This requires a 
sufficiently large discount factor . In economies of four players, the absorbing state can be 
reached very quickly, hence * is low. 
Several remarks are in order. First, due to private monitoring, T-periods punishment 
strategies cannot support the efficient outcome as an equilibrium (see Ellison, 1994). Second, 
that same paper indicates that the efficient outcome could be sustained in our experiment also by 
adopting contagious punishment strategies that exploit the availability of a public randomization 
device. This is so because in every period all session participants observed the same random 
integer number, which could have served as a public randomization device. Third, cooperation is 
risk-dominant in our design, in the following sense. Compare the strategy “always defect” to 
“grim trigger”; grim trigger is risk-dominant if a player is at least indifferent to selecting it, given 
that everyone else is believed to select each of the two strategies with equal probability. 
Indifference requires = 0.763. 
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Finally—and most importantly— in our private-monitoring economies the use of personal 
punishment is neither necessary nor sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome as an equilibrium 
among identical, self-interested agents. The personal punishment opportunity gives players the 
(costly) option to lower their opponents’ earnings, after observing the outcome of the prisoners’ 
dilemma. In one-shot interactions, using personal punishment is a dominated action because it is 
costly for the punisher. Given indefinite repetition, personal punishment is not theoretically 
necessary, for two reasons. First, players can adopt the social norm based on grim trigger to 
sustain the efficient outcome. Second, the use of personal punishment does not allow players to 
trigger a faster contagious process of defection, because actions cannot be observed outside a 
match. On the other hand, the use of personal punishment alone is not theoretically sufficient to 
sustain the efficient outcome because it is not credible, although it could be used in combination 
with the threat of switching to harsher punishments (e.g., a penal code-type of strategy that 
presumes a switch to “always defect” if a defector is not sanctioned with personal punishment). 
In short, standard theoretical arguments do not suggest that personal punishment facilitates the 
emergence of a cooperative outcome. 
 
5 Estimation procedures for individual strategies 
This section describes the methodology adopted for the empirical identification of the strategies 
employed by individuals in the experiment. The unit of observation is the sequence of all choices 
made by a subject in a cycle (=an individual); we may also refer to such a sequence as one 
observation. Hence, each subject in the experiment contributed five observations to the dataset. 
In this repeated game there are infinitely many strategies. The data analysis in this paper 
focuses on twelve strategies, some of which are consistent with equilibrium behavior, while 
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others are not (Table 3). Consider that any type of behavior observed in the experiment can be 
described by a sufficiently complex strategy. We used the following approach to select the 
twelve strategies. First, we have considered strategies that rely neither on personal punishment 
nor on personal punishment histories; as noted earlier, personal punishment is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome, hence we study the use of personal punishment 
separately from the behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. Second, we have included the two 
unconditional strategies “always defect” and “always cooperate,” as well as ten conditional 
strategies of cooperation for which there is already some empirical support (Dal Bó and 
Fréchette, 2011, Fudenberg et al., 2012, Camera, Casari and Bigoni, 2012). The ten conditional 
strategies allow us to gauge the complexity of subjects’ behavior, since they include strategies 
that condition on short as well as on longer histories of play. We included “tit-for-tat” and “grim 
trigger”, and eight longer-memory versions of such strategies that exhibit either a longer fuse to 
triggering the punishment phase or a longer punishment phase. 
 
Strategy 
 
Description 
 
Unconditional  
Always cooperate Always choose C (=cooperate) 
Always defect Always choose D (=defect) 
Unforgiving  
Grim trigger Cooperate until an opponent defects, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim2-A Cooperate until 2 opponents defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim2-B Cooperate until 2 opponents consecutively defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim3-A Cooperate until 3 opponents defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim3-B Cooperate until 3 opponents consecutively defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
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Forgiving  
Tit for Tat (TFT) Cooperate unless the previous opponent defected. 
Two-tits-for-tat (2TFT) Cooperate unless an opponent defected in any of the last 2 rounds (play D for two consecutive rounds after a defection is observed) 
Tit-for-two-tats (TF2T) Cooperate unless the opponents defected in each of the last 2 rounds. 
Three-tits-for-tat (3TFT) Cooperate unless an opponent defected in any of the last 3 rounds (play D for three consecutive rounds after a defection is observed) 
Tit-for-three-tats (TF3T) Cooperate unless the opponents defected in each of the last 3 rounds. 
Table 3. Strategies considered 
It is convenient to group the strategies listed in Table 3 into three distinct strategy sets. The 
first set includes strategies in which actions are unconditional on histories and prescribe the 
indefinite repetition of the same action in the prisoner’s dilemma: “always cooperate” and 
“always defect.” The remaining ten conditional strategies prescribe cooperation in the initial 
period, and we divide them into two sets. One includes unforgiving strategies, in which one or 
more observed defections triggers a switch to a permanent punishment phase; this comprises 
“grim trigger” and more lenient versions of such strategy, in which the switch to the punishment 
phase is triggered only if more than one defection is observed (consecutively and not). The last 
strategy set includes forgiving strategies, in which observed defections trigger a temporary 
punishment phase. This comprises “tit for tat” and more lenient or less forgiving variants that 
have either a delay in triggering to the punishment phase or have a longer punishment phase. 
While “Always Defect” and “Grim Trigger” are equilibrium strategies, other considered 
strategies, such as “Always cooperate,” are clearly not. 
We estimate the importance of each candidate strategy with a maximum likelihood approach, 
as in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2012). The estimation employs data 
from all cycles and presumes that (i) in a cycle, all subjects face the same probability distribution 
of adopting one of the 12 strategies considered, (ii) subjects may change strategy from cycle to 
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cycle (but not within a cycle), and (iii) subjects may make errors in implementing actions, i.e., 
there is some probability (time-invariant, and identical across subjects) that a subject may choose 
an action that is not recommended by the strategy adopted.7 
In the PP treatment subjects could use personal punishment to immediately respond to an 
opponent’s action. We are especially interested in studying if and how subjects use personal 
punishment to complement or to substitute for sanctions based on defection. To this end, we 
have considered only strategies that condition on the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma in the 
first stage of the game, but do not condition on histories of play from previous periods. For 
simplicity, we have included only strategies that prescribe personal punishment solely if 
someone defected.8 Hence, we end up considering eight “punishment strategies”, because 
personal punishment might be selected only in three possible outcomes of the prisoner’s 
dilemma: CD, DC, and DD. The prevalence of each of these eight punishment strategies is 
estimated using the same maximum likelihood approach. 
 
6 Results 
This section presents a comparison of outcomes and strategies for different subject pools. The 
findings are organized into five main results. The first result concerns the differences in overall 
cooperation rates across treatments. The second result illustrates the strategies adopted by the 
two subject pools in the treatments without personal punishment. The third and the fourth results 
describe students and workers’ strategies in the treatments with personal punishment. Finally, the 
fifth result discusses subject-pool differences in the use of personal punishment. 
                                                 
7 The estimation was executed adapting the code included in the supplementary material of Dal Bó and Fréchette 
(2011). The details of the estimation procedure are reported in Appendix A. 
8 This is because in the PP treatment, individuals used personal punishment in less than 0.5% of the periods in which 
CC was the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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Result 1. Average cooperation rates are higher among students than workers in all treatments. 
Figure 1 and Table 4 provide support for Result 1. Consider Figure 1: in the NP treatment, the 
cooperation rate in all periods is 16.1 percentage points higher for students than for workers;9 
when restricting attention to the first period of each cycle, the cooperation rate is 10.5 percentage 
points higher for students than for workers. Table 4 reports the results of formal tests to assess 
the significance of such differences in cooperation rates; the difference in cooperation rates 
across all periods is significant at the 5% level (column 1), but is not significant when 
considering only the first period (column 2). 
A similar finding emerges from the PP treatment. Students’ cooperation rate is 11.1 
percentage points higher than workers’ in all periods, and 11 percentage points higher when 
considering only the first period of each cycle. Differences are significant at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively (Table 4, column 2). 
                                                 
9 For cycle k=1,..,K of a session, define the action of subject j=1,.., J in period t=1,..,Tk as aitk0,1, where 1 is 
cooperation. The cooperation rate of subject j is   Kk Kk kTt ktjj Ta=c k1 11  between 0 and 1 (reported in %), 
and across subjects is  Jj j Jc=c 1 . So, if cycles have different length Tk, then they receive different weight in the 
measure c of average cooperation. 
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Figure 1. Cooperation rates 
Notes to Figure 1: NP= treatment without personal punishment; PP=treatment with personal punishment. 
Cooperation rates are calculated across all periods of all cycles, first by dividing the number of periods of all five 
cycles in which a subject cooperated by the total number of periods played, then by taking the average across 
subjects. This implies that the weight of each cycle on the cooperation rate in a session is proportional to its length, 
but all the sessions in the treatment are equally weighted.  
 
 All periods Periods 1 
 Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Marginal effect 
(s.e.) 
PP treatment 0.142** 
(0.055) 
0.127 
(0.102) 
Worker × NP treatment -0.164** 
(0.053) 
-0.092 
(0.094) 
Worker × PP treatment -0.125** 
(0.041) 
-0.127*** 
(0.047) 
Constant 0.570*** 
(0.046) 
--- 
   
Observations 800 800 
R-squared 0.091 --- 
Pseudo-R squared --- 0.027 
Table 4. Initial and average cooperation rates 
Notes to Table 4: The second column reports the marginal effects obtained by a logit regression where the 
dependent variable is the binary decision to cooperate (=1) or defect (=0) in period 1 of each cycle. The first column 
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reports the estimated coefficients from an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the average 
cooperation rate for each individual (i.e., for each subject in a cycle). In this OLS regression, each observation is 
weighted for the length of the cycle it belongs to, so cycles with longer length have more weight. In both 
regressions, we include three independent variables, which capture treatment effects. The first regressor is a dummy 
that takes value 1 in the treatment with Personal Punishment, and zero otherwise. The second and third regressors 
interact the dummy “worker” (taking value 1 for subjects who are not undergraduate students, zero otherwise) with 
the two dummies for the NP and PP treatment. These last two regressors capture the difference in average 
cooperation rates between students and workers, in the distinct cases with and without personal punishment. We 
obtain qualitatively similar results by running a Tobit regression instead of an OLS regression. Regression results for 
this robustness check are available from the authors upon request. In parenthesis we report standard errors robust for 
clustering at the session level: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Result 2. In the treatment without personal punishment, students and workers differ in their 
strategy adoption. Workers do not select “always defect” as frequently as students, and they also 
select “forgiving” strategies less frequently. Differences between students and workers, 
however, are not significant. 
Support for Result 2 comes from Table 5, which reports the maximum likelihood estimates 
of the population proportions for each of the 12 strategies considered. For both samples, the most 
frequent single strategy is “always defect,” followed by “always cooperate.” Hence, 
unconditional strategies prevail among subjects. 
 Students  Workers 
Strategy Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
Unconditional        
Always cooperate 0.177 *** 0.039  0.164 *** 0.024 
Always Defect 0.238 *** 0.060  0.366 *** 0.051 
Unforgiving        
Grim trigger 0.061 ** 0.025  0.101 * 0.052 
Grim2-A 0.021 * 0.012  0.088 *** 0.031 
Grim2-B 0.060 ** 0.024  0.000  0.015 
Grim3-A 0.049 *** 0.018  0.000  0.000 
Grim3-B 0.099 *** 0.023  0.083 ** 0.033 
Forgiving        
Tit for Tat 0.078 *** 0.017  0.054  0.034 
2TFT 0.034 *** 0.010  0.000  0.013 
TF2T 0.057 ** 0.025  0.076 * 0.046 
3TFT 0.026  0.018  0.030  0.024 
TF3T 0.101 *   0.037 *  
gamma 0.438 *** 0.014   0.619 *** 0.057 
Log-likelihood 1319.767    1359.284   
N 200       200     
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Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of strategy adoption (NP treatment) 
The estimated shares of “always defect” are 23.8% for students and 36.6% for workers (p-value: 
0.1012); the shares of “forgiving” strategies are 29.6% for students and 19.7% for workers (p-
value: 0.4143).10 
Table 5 also reports the estimate for the parameter , which controls the variance of the error 
distribution in implementing the action prescribed by the selected strategy. This variance is 
significantly higher among workers than students (p-value: 0.0020), which suggests that it is 
more difficult to capture workers’ behavior through the set of strategies considered. 
 
Result 3: In the treatment with personal punishment, students cooperate more than in the 
treatment without. When personal punishment is available, students adopt unforgiving strategies 
more frequently and “always defect” less frequently. 
Figure 1 shows that, considering all periods, the cooperation rate for students increases from 55.8 
percent in the NP treatment to 70.4 percent in the PP treatment, as already noted in Camera and 
Casari (2009). This difference is significant at the 5% level (Table 4). The maximum likelihood 
estimation of strategies helps us to understand why this happens, as it describes a substantial 
change in the adopted strategies. It is important to recall that the strategies estimated in Table 5 
explicitly focus on patterns of behavior in the prisoners’ dilemma and do not condition on 
personal punishment; the use of personal punishment is analyzed later. Students are less likely to 
adopt unconditional strategies when personal punishment is available; the estimated share of 
                                                 
10 As in Fudenberg et al. (2012, footnote 38) we report the results of a two-sample t-test using bootstrapped standard 
errors of the aggregated coefficients. We cannot compute the test for the set of “forgiving strategies”, as the standard 
error for strategy TF3T is not directly estimated. In this case, we report the t-test using the aggregated coefficients 
and the standard errors for the other strategies that are not included among the set of “forgiving strategies”. 
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“always cooperate” drops a few points, while the estimated share of “always defect” dramatically 
drops from 23.8% to 7.8% (see Table 5 vs. Table 6, p-value: 0.0091). The data show a 
substantial increase both in the share of “unforgiving” strategies (from 29.0% to 38.4%, p-value: 
0.0659) and in the share of “forgiving” strategies (from 29.6% to 41.8%, p-value: 0.2291). The 
availability of personal punishment seems to motivate students to make an attempt at 
coordinating on cooperation. This is done by adopting strategies that start with cooperation and 
prescribe a switch to a punishment phase only after one or more defections are observed.  
Interestingly, the increase in cooperation rates is associated with the adoption of conditional 
rather than unconditional cooperative strategies. One could have conjectured that what sustained 
high cooperation in the PP treatment was the “always cooperate” strategy, together with the use 
of personal punishment targeted to defectors. The estimation of individual strategies adopted by 
students provides no support for this conjecture. As shown below, the data exhibit different 
patterns for workers. 
 Students  Workers 
strategy Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
Unconditional        
Always cooperate 0.120 *** 0.028  0.264 *** 0.045 
Always defect 0.078 *** 0.013  0.254 *** 0.024 
Unforgiving        
Grim trigger 0.078 *** 0.025  0.054 *** 0.015 
Grim2-A 0.065 ** 0.029  0.106 *** 0.022 
Grim2-B 0.128 *** 0.049  0.000  0.002 
Grim3-A 0.016 * 0.010  0.000  0.000 
Grim3-B 0.097 *** 0.027  0.122 *** 0.035 
Forgiving        
Tit for Tat 0.120 *** 0.022  0.019  0.018 
2TFT 0.000  0.001  0.060 *** 0.022 
TF2T 0.185 *** 0.035  0.023  0.014 
3TFT 0.024  0.022  0.000  0.005 
TF3T 0.089 ***   0.099 ***  
gamma 0.420 *** 0.026   0.564 *** 0.028 
Log-likelihood 1504.425    1288.470   
N 200       200     
Table 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of strategy adoption (PP treatment).  
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Result 4: In the treatment with personal punishment, workers cooperate more than in the 
treatment without punishment. When personal punishment is available, workers follow “always 
cooperate” more frequently and “always defect” less frequently. 
Figure 1 shows that, considering all periods, the cooperation rate for workers increases from 
39.7% in the NP treatment to 59.3% in the PP treatment (a test on the estimated coefficients in 
Table 4 indicates that the difference is significant t the 1% level). The impact of the availability 
of personal punishment on overall cooperation rates is therefore similar across subject pools. 
However, the impact on strategy adoption is qualitatively different. 
Workers are less likely to adopt “always defect” and more likely to adopt “always cooperate” 
when personal punishment is available (see Table 5 vs. Table 6). The estimated shares drop from 
36.6% to 25.4% for “always defect” (p-value: 0.0469) and increase from 16.4% to 26.4% for 
“always cooperate” (p-value: 0.0505). The changes are approximately of the same magnitude, 
and only minimal variations appear for “Forgiving” and “Unforgiving” strategies. A comparison 
of Tables 5 and 6 suggests that, in the case of workers, the availability of personal punishment 
options raises the prevalence of “always cooperate” by about 10 percentage points, while 
decreasing the prevalence of “always defect” by the same amount. One interpretation is that 
workers in our experiment substituted the cooperative for the uncooperative unconditional 
strategy.  
 
Result 5: Workers use personal punishment less frequently than students. 
The support for Result 5 is in Table 7, which reports results for a maximum likelihood estimation 
of the prevalence of the eight personal punishment strategies considered, separated by subject 
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pool. In the experiment, the strategy that prescribes to never use personal punishment (“never 
punish”) has a 62.8% share among workers and 44.1% among students. (p-value: 0.1425). In 
both subject pools personal punishment is basically used only to sanction a defection of the 
opponent. The strategy that prescribes personal punishment only when the subject cooperates 
and the opponent defects (“punish cheaters”), is more widely adopted among students than 
workers (38.7% among students vs. 21.9% among workers, p-value: 0.0951). The share of 
students and workers who punish a defector when they have also defected (“punish all 
defections”) is, instead, identical (p-value ≈ 1.000). 
Given our previous Results 3 and 4, we can interpret this finding as an indication that the 
availability of personal punishment has a different impact on the way students and workers 
police deviations from cooperation. Students use personal punishment as a tool that 
complements decentralized punishment. Relative to the NP treatment, in the PP treatment 
students are more likely to adopt strategies that trigger a decentralized punishment phase (when a 
defection is observed), and to also use personal punishment on defectors. Instead, workers are 
more likely to adopt unconditional cooperative strategies in the PP than in the NP treatment, 
sanctioning defections with personal punishment rather than with decentralized punishment. 
 Students  Workers 
Personal punishment strategy Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
Never punish (000) 0.441 *** 0.064  0.628 *** 0.110 
Punish cheaters (100) 0.387 *** 0.062  0.219 *** 0.079 
Punish all defections (101) 0.116 ** 0.048  0.116 *** 0.039 
Always punish (111) 0.036  N.A.  0.000  N.A. 
Other punishment strategies 
(001, 010, 011, and 110) 0.021  N.A.  0.037  N.A. 
 0.294 *** 0.018  0.345 *** 0.021 
Log-likelihood 748.661    646.876   
N 200      200     
Table 7. Maximum Likelihood Estimation on punishment strategies adoption 
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Notes to Table 7: Punishment strategies are coded as follows: 0 means “do not punish”, 1 means “punish”. The first 
digit of the strategy is the action to be taken when the subject cooperates and the opponent defects. The second 
indicates the action to be taken when the subject defects and the opponent cooperates. The third indicates the action 
to be taken when the subject defects and the opponent defects. 
 
7  Conclusions 
This paper reports results from an experiment on social dilemmas that involved a pool of college 
students and one of clerical workers. It contributes to the literature on cooperation in two ways. 
First, a methodological contribution is associated to the discovery of differences in behavior 
across the subject pools. Most of the existing laboratory studies on this topic have been 
conducted only with college students as subjects. The data show that not all results from student 
subjects can be generalized. Workers in our experiment tended to cooperate with an overall 
lower frequency and to start defecting from the beginning of the game. In contrast, previous 
studies have found that students are on average less cooperative than other subject pools. There 
may be a variety of possible explanations. On the one hand, clerical workers may be a peculiar 
sample that differs from other samples of the adult population. Perhaps, these differences 
originate in a stronger orientation toward individual tasks, as these characterize clerical work. 
This may feed back in the clerical workers’ ability to coordinate with others on cooperative 
tasks. On the other hand, our clerical workers did not have prior direct experience with 
laboratory experiments, unlike undergraduate students who might have learned, through 
participation in prior experiments, that cooperating could lead to higher earnings. Another 
possible explanation is that social dilemmas with known, deterministic duration may simply 
induce qualitatively different behavior than dilemmas in which duration is indefinite, as in our 
experiment. 
A second contribution of the paper emerges from comparing the individual strategy adoption 
 25
in the prisoner’s dilemma, in treatments with and without a personal punishment opportunity. 
Workers were more likely to unconditionally cooperate in treatments with personal punishment 
than in treatments without it. On the contrary, the introduction of personal punishment made 
students more likely to adopt a cooperative strategy based on the threat of temporary 
punishment, i.e., to adopt “forgiving” strategies. 
In the treatment with a personal punishment opportunity, there were additional remarkable 
differences between students and workers. Students no longer followed “always defect,” while 
the prevalence of this uncooperative behavior among workers, albeit lower, remained strong. In 
general, personal punishment in the experiment was either not used or it was used to sanction 
defectors. There was virtually no anti-social punishment among both students and workers, i.e., 
defectors did not punish cooperators. The one difference is that workers were overall less likely 
than students to use personal punishment. 
These findings show that, when faced with a cooperative task, dissimilar subject pools 
exhibit different strategy profiles. In particular, we observe two disparities. One the one hand, 
workers were less prone to adopt cooperative strategies. Even in treatments with personal 
punishment, no less than one fourth of the workers started by defecting and continued to defect 
unconditionally. On the other hand, workers were overall less inclined to follow strategies that 
sanctioned uncooperative behavior either by adopting decentralized punishment or personal 
punishment. These two findings may explain why we observed less cooperation among workers 
than among students. 
This study suggests that one should be cautious about generalizing to other subject pools the 
results that emerge from studies conducted with college students. Although treatment differences 
across subject pools did not reverse the direction of the effect, quantitative estimates of results 
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were at times far apart across subject pools, and went in an unexpected direction if compared to 
prior experiments. Being hard to identify a clear, specific factor behind the observed differences, 
this study calls for more experiments with non-standard subject pools, in order to further 
corroborate the robustness of findings from laboratory experiments. 
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